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Abstract. In recent years the amount of digital data in the world has risen 
immensely. But, the more information exists, the greater is the possibility of its 
unwanted disclosure. Thus, the data privacy protection has become a pressing 
problem of the present time. 
The task of individual privacy-preserving is being thoroughly studied 
nowadays. At the same time, the problem of statistical disclosure control for 
collective (or group) data is still open. 
In this paper we propose an effective and relatively simple (wavelet-based) way 
to provide group anonymity in collective data. We also provide a real-life 
example to illustrate the method. 
Keywords: statistical disclosure control, privacy-preserving data mining, group 
anony mity, wavelet analysis. 
1   Introduction 
Year by year more and more data emerge in the world. According to the latest IDC 
research [1], the Dig ital Universe will double every 18 months, and the number of 
"security-intensive" information will grow from 30% to roughly 45% by the end of 
2012. This means that the risk of privacy violation and confidential data disclosure 
rises dramatically. The threat doesn't only comprise the possibility of stealing a credit 
card and social security numbers, patient medical records and images, Internet 
commerce and other transaction data. It is popular nowadays to provide direct access 
to the depersonalized and non-aggregated primary data. E.g., one can easily gain 
access to the microfile data in census statistics and sociology. But, if these data aren't 
protected, individual anonymity can easily be violated. That has been clearly shown 
by Sweeney [2, p. 21]. Using Massachusetts voters data, she proved that knowing a 
person's birth date and full 9-d igit ZIP code is enough to identify 97% of voters. 
A problem of indiv idual anonymity in primary data isn't a new one. It is being 
more or less successfully solved as one of the main tasks in privacy-preserving data 
mining. There are different statistical disclosure control methods [3] which guarantee: 
- k-anonymity [4]. Th is means every attribute values combination corresponds 
to at least k  respondents existing in the dataset sharing the combination; 
- even more delicate l-d iversity [5] and t-closeness [6]. 
At the same time a problem of providing group (collective) anonymity is still open 
[7]. By group anonymity we understand protecting such data features that can't be 
distinguished by considering individual records only. E.g., we cannot protect the 
regional distribution of young unemployed females in terms of inid ividual anonymity. 
Either individual or group anonymity can be provided by introducing an acceptable 
level of uncertainty to the primary data. By making specific data records impossible 
to distinguish among the others, we guarantee required privacy-preserving. 
When providing data anonymity, both group and individual, it is important to take 
into account the adversarial model which reflects what information is known to an 
adversary, and what is not. 
In our work, we suppose that the potential adversary doesn't possess any other 
additional info rmation except for the one contained in the primary data. 
In general, there exist a variety of approaches to solving the group anonymity 
problem. In this paper, we will discuss a so-called extremum transition approach. Its 
main idea is to swap records with specific attribute values between the positions of 
their ext reme concentrations and the other permitted ones. 
Depending on the task definit ion, we can implement this approach by: 
- swapping values of required attributes between respondents; 
- transferring a respondent to be protected to the other place of liv ing (to the 
other place of work). In most cases it is natural to transfer not only a single 
respondent, but the whole respondent's family as well;  
- mere modifying the attribute values. 
Of course, it's easy to provide group anonymity. A ll we need is a permission to 
move respondents between any possible places (as long as the population number on a 
particular territory remains stable). But such primary data deformation almost 
inevitably leads to considerable utility loss. Imagine that we want to transfer some 
respondents to a particular territory. But, there are not enough people of the same sex 
and age to fit our new " migrants". Obviously, such a transfer cannot be acceptable. 
All this leads to a question. If we know what to modify to provide data group 
anonymity, what should we preserve to prevent data utility loss? 
In general, it is possible to preserve absolute quantities only for a particular 
population category (all the population provided, respondents with required values of 
a certain attribute etc.). But, in many cases researches can be interested in the relative 
values rather than in the absolute ones. Let us consider some typical examples. 
1. True quantity of military (or special service) officers can be absolutely 
confidential. Th is is also the case for their regional d istribution. At the same time, 
informat ion on their distribution by age, marital status or, say, wife's occupation can 
be very interesting and useful for sociologists. 
2. In developing countries, there is usually no public statistics on a company's 
income. In this case, information on the company's income growth rates can serve as 
an important marker of its economic status and development prospective. 
We come to conclusion that we need to preserve relations between strata, 
distribution levels, data ranges rather than the absolute values. But, it's not easy to 
alter data records with a particular attribute values combination and preserve 
proportional relat ions between all the other possible ones. Such a problem seems to be 
as complex as the k-anonymization problem. The latter, as stated in [8], is an NP-hard 
problem. 
Certainly, there are different techniques that can aid in finding a balance between 
altering primary data and preventing utility loss. For instance, we can try to perform 
such data swapping that main statistical features such as data mean value and their 
standard deviation will persist. For example, in [11], a specific normalizing process to 
preserve these features is introduced. 
But, in the current paper we propose to use wavelet transform (WT) instead. 
Surely, WT doesn't guarantee the persistance of all statistical data features (except for 
their mean value which will be discussed later in the paper), but it can preserve some 
informat ion that can come in handy for specific studies. 
Generally speaking, WT is an effective way to present a square-integrable signal 
by a basis obtained from certain wavelet and scaling functions providing its both time 
and frequency representation. We consider WT to be acceptable because: 
- It splits primary data into approximation and multilevel details. To protect 
data, we can redistribute approximation values considering particular attribute values 
combinations. Besides, we can prevent utility loss by leaving details unchanged (or by 
altering them proportionally). In this case, proportional relations between different 
attribute values ranges will be preserved. To illustrate that, let's refer to [9]. In Russia, 
studying the responses to 44 public opin ion polls (1994-2001) showed the following 
result. It turned out that details reflect hidden time series features which come in 
handy for near-term and medium-term social processes forecasting. 
- We can use the fast Mallat's pyramid algorithm [10]. Its runtime complexity is 
O(n), where n is the maximum wavelet decomposition level. 
- WT is already being successfully and intensively used to provide individual 
anonymity [11]. 
Thereby, in this work we set and solve a following task. We want to provide group 
anonymity for depersonalized respondent data according to particular attribute 
combination. We propose to complete this task using WT. In this case, group 
anonymity is gained through redistributing wavelet approximat ion values. Fixing data 
mean value and leaving wavelet details unchanged (or proportionally altering them) 
preserves data features which might become useful for specific researches. 
Figuratively speaking, we change the relief (approximat ion) of a restricted area, but 
try to preserve local data distribution (details). 
We would also like to admit that there is no feasible algorithm to restore primary 
data after modify ing them using the proposed method. 
2   Theoretic Background 
2.1   General Group Anonymity Definitions 
Let the microfile data be presented as Table 1. In this table, μ  stands for the number 
of records (respondents), η  stands for the number of attributes, ir  stands for the 
thi  
record, ju  stands for the thj  attribute, ijz  stands for a microfile data element. 
 
 
Table 1. Microfile data.  
 1u  2u  … ηu  
1r  11z  12z  … 1ηz  
2r  21z  22z  … 2ηz  
… … … … … 
μr  μ1z  μ2z  … μηz  
 
To provide group anonymity we need to decide first which attribute values and of 
what groups we would like to protect. 
Let us denote by vS  a subset of a Cartesian product 1 2 ...v v vlu u u× × ×  of Tab le 1  
columns. Here, iv , 1,i l=  are integers. We will call an element 
( ) ,v vks S∈  
1, ,μv vk l l= ≤  a vital value combination because such combinations are vital for 
solving our task. Respectively, each element of ( )vks  will be called a vital value, and 
v ju  will be called a vital attribute. 
Our task is to protect some of the vital value combinations. E.g., if we took "Age" 
and "Employment status" as vital attributes we could possibly be interested in 
providing anonymity for the vital value combination ("Middle-aged"; 
"Unemployed"). 
We will also denote by pS  a subset of microfile data elements corresponding to 
the thp  attribute, 1,ip v i l≠ ∀ = . Elements 
( ) ,p pks S∈  1, ,μp pk l l= ≤  will be 
called parameter values, whereas thp  attribute will be called a parameter attribute 
because it will be used for div iding microfile data into groups to be analyzed. 
For example, if we took "Place of living" as a parameter attribute we could obtain 
groups of "Urban" and "Rural" residents. 
After having defined both parameter and vital attributes and values, we need to 
calculate the quantities of respondents that correspond to a specific pair of a vital 
value combination and a parameter value 
These quantities can be gathered into an array 1 2( , ,..., )mq q q q=  which we will 
call a quantity signal. 
To provide group anonymity for the microfile we need to replace this quantity 
signal with another one: 1 2( , ,..., )mq q q q=    . Also, we need to preserve specific data 
features. 
First of all, we need to make sure that the overall number of records remains stable: 
1 1
m m
i i
i i
q q
= =
=∑ ∑  . 
And, as it was mentioned in Section 1, we also need to preserve all the wavelet 
decomposition details of signal q  up to some level k  (or at least alter them 
proportionally). 
Possible solution to the task is proposed in the following subsections. 
2.2   General Wavelet Transform Definitions 
In this subsection we will revise the WT basics which are necessary for the further 
explanation. For detailed information see [10]. 
Let us call an array 1 2( , ,..., )ms s s s=  of discrete values a signal. 
Let a high-pass wavelet filter be denoted as 1 2( , ,..., )nh h h h= , and a low-pass 
wavelet filter be denoted as 1 2( , ,..., )nl l l l= . 
To perform signal s  one-level wavelet decomposition, we need to carry out 
following operations: 
1 12 2;n na s l d s h↓ ↓= ∗ = ∗ . (1) 
In (1), a convolution (which is denoted by ∗ ) of s  and l  is taken, and then the 
result is being dyadically downsampled (denoted by 2n↓ ). Also, 1a  is an array of 
approximation coefficients, whereas 1d  is an array of detail coefficients. 
To obtain approximation and detail coefficients at level k , we need to perform (1) 
on approximation coefficients at level 1k − : 
2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1
1
(( ) ) ((( ) )... ; ... )n n n n n n nk k k k
k times k times
a a l s l l d a h s l l h↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓− −
−
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= = = =
 
. 
(2) 
We can always present an initial signal s  as 
1
k
k i
i
s A D
=
= +∑ . (3) 
Here, kA  is called an approximation at level k , and iD  is called a detail at level i . 
Approximation and details from (3) can be presented as follows: 
2 2 2 2 2(( ) ); ((( ) ) )k k k kn n n n n
k times k-1 times
A a l l D d h l l↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑= ∗ ∗ = ∗ ∗ ∗ 
 
. 
(4) 
In (4), ka  and kd  are being dyadically upsampled (which is denoted by 2n↑ ) first, 
and then convoluted with the appropriate wavelet filter. 
As we can see, all kA  elements depend on the ka  coefficients. 
According to Section 1, we need to somehow modify the approximat ion, and at the 
same time preserve the details. As it follows from (4), details do not depend on 
approximation coefficients. Thus, preserving detail coefficients preserves the details. 
Respectively, to modify the approximat ion we have to modify corresponding 
approximation coefficients. 
2.3   Obtaining New Approximation Using Wavelet Reconstruction Matrices  
In [12], it is shown that WT can be performed using matrix multip licat ions. In 
particular, we can always construct a matrix such that  
k rec kA M a= ⋅ . (5) 
For example, recM  can be obtained by consequent mult iplication of appropriate 
upsampling and convolution matrices. 
We will call recM  a wavelet reconstruction matrix (W RM). 
Now, let us apply WRM to solve the problem stated in Subsection 2.1. 
Let 1 2( , ,..., )mq q q q=  be a quantity signal of length m . Let also 1 2( , ,..., )nl l l l=  
denote a low-pass wavelet filter. 
Taking into consideration (5), all we need to do is to find new coefficients ka
 . For 
example, they can be found by solving a linear programming problem with constraints 
obtained from matrix recM . Then, adding new approximat ion kA

 and all the details 
corresponding to q , we can get a new quantity signal q . 
In many cases, adding kA

 can result in the negative values of a new signal q , 
which is totally unacceptable. In this case we can modify q  to make it non-negative 
(e.g., by adding to each element of q  a suitable value), and thus receive a new signal 
qˆ . 
Another problem arises. The mean value of the resultant signal qˆ  will obviously 
differ from the initial one. To overcome this problem, we need to mult iply it by such a 
coefficient that the result has the required mean value. Due to the algebraic properties 
of convolution, both resultant details' and approximat ion' absolute values will differ 
from the init ial ones by that precise coefficient. This means that the details will be 
changed proportionally which totally suits our problem statement requirements. In 
result, we obtain our required signal q . 
To illustrate this method we will consider a practical example. 
3   Experimental Results 
To show the method under review in action, we took the 5-Percent Public Use 
Microdata Sample Files from U.S. Census Bureau [13] corresponding to the 2000 
U.S. Census microfile data on the state of California. 
The microfile provides various information on more than 1,6 million respondents. 
We took a "Military service" attribute as a vital one. This attribute is a categorical 
one. Its values are integers from 0 to 4. For simplicity, we took one vital value 
combination consisting of only one vital value, i.e. "1". It  stands for "Active duty". 
We also took "Place of Work Super-PUMA" as a parameter attribute. This attribute 
is also a categorical one. Its values stand for different statistical area codes. 
For our example, we decided to take the following attribute values as parameter 
ones: 06010, 06020, 06030, 06040, 06060, 06070, 06080, 06090, 06130, 06170, 
06200, 06220, 06230, 06409, 06600 and 06700. These codes correspond to border, 
coastal and island statistical areas. 
By choosing these exact attributes we actually set a task of protecting information 
on military officers' number distribution over particular Californian statistical areas. 
According to Section 2, we need to construct an appropriate quantity signal. The 
simplest way to do that is to count respondents with appropriate pair of a  vital value 
combination and a parameter value. The results are shown in Table 2 (the third row). 
Let's use the second order Daubechies low-pass wavelet filter 
1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3, , ,
4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
l
 + + − −
≡   
 
 to perform two-level wavelet decomposition (2) 
of a corresponding quantity signal (all the calculations were carried out with 12 
decimal numbers, but we will present all the numeric data with 3 decimal numbers): 
2 2 2 2 2( (1), (2), (3), (4))a a a a a= = (2272.128, 136.352, 158.422, 569.098).  
Now, let us construct a suitable WRM: 
 
0.637 0 0 0.137
0.296 0.233 0 0.029
0.079 0.404 0 0.017
0.012 0.512 0 0
0.137 0.637 0 0
0.029 0.296 0.233 0
0.017 0.079 0.404 0
0 0.012 0.512 0
0 0.137 0.637 0
0 0.029 0.296 0.233
0 0.017 0.079 0.404
0 0 0.012 0.512
0 0 0.137 0.637
0.233
recM
−
−
−
−
−
−
=
−
−
−
−
.
0 0.029 0.296
0.404 0 0.017 0.079
0.512 0 0  0.012
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 − 
 
 
− 
 
 
According to (5), we obtain a signal approximation: 
2A = (1369.821, 687.286, 244.677, 41.992, –224.98, 11.373, 112.86, 79.481, 
82.24, 175.643, 244.757, 289.584, 340.918, 693.698, 965.706, 1156.942). 
 
As we can see, according to the extremum transition approach, we have to lower 
the military men quantity in the 06700 area. At the same time, we have to raise 
appropriate quantities in some other areas. The particular choice either may depend on 
any additional goals to achieve or it can be absolutely arbitrary. 
But, along with this, we have to avoid incidental raising of the other signal 
elements. We can achieve this by using appropriate constraints. Also, it is necessary 
to note down that there can possibly be some signal elements which do not play 
important role, i.e. we can change them without any restrictions. 
To show how to formally express suitable constraints, we decided to raise the 
quantities in such central-part signal elements like 06070, 06080, 06090, 06130, 
06170 and 06200; besides, we have chosen the first and the last three signal elements 
to lower their values. 
Considering these requirements, we get the fo llowing constraints: 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
0.637 (1) 0.137 (4) 1369.821
0.296 (1) 0.233 (2) 0.029 (4) 687.286
0.079 (1) 0.404 (2) 0.017 (4) 244.677
0.137 (1) 0.637 (2) 224.980
0.029 (1) 0.296 (2) 0.233 (3)
a a
a a a
a a a
a a
a a a
⋅ − ⋅ ≤
⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ≤
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≤
− ⋅ + ⋅ ≥ −
− ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
  
  
 
  
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
11.373
0.017 (1) 0.079 (2) 0.404 (3) 112.860
0.012 (2) 0.512 (3) 79.481
0.137 (2) 0.637 (3) 82.240
0.029 (2) 0.296 (3) 0.233 (4) 175.643
0.233 (1) 0.029 (3) 0.296
a a a
a a
a a
a a a
a a a
≥
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
− ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
− ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
− ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≥
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
  
 
 
  
  
2
2 2 2
2 2
(4) 693.698
0.404 (1) 0.017 (3) 0.079 (4) 965.706
 0.512 (1) 0.012 (4)  1 156.942 .
a a a
a a














 ≤
 ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ≤

⋅ − ⋅ ≤
  
 
 
A possible solution is 2a =
 (0, 379.097, 31805.084, 5464.854). 
Using recM  and (5), we can get a new approximation: 
2A =

(–750.103, –70.090, 244.677, 194.196, 241.583, 7530.756, 12879.498, 
16287.810, 20216.058, 10670.153, 4734.636, 2409.508, –883.021, 693.698, 965.706, 
–66.997). 
Since our integral aim is to preserve signal details, we construct our masked 
quantity signal by adding a new approximat ion and primary details: 
2 1 2q A D D= + + =

 (–2100.924, –745.376, 153.000, 223.204, 479.563, 7598.383, 
12773.639, 16241.328, 20149.818, 10764.510, 5301.879, 2254.924, –982.939, 
14.000, 60.000, 3113.061). 
As we can see, some signal elements are negative. Since quantities cannot be 
negative, we need to add to every signal's element an appropriate value, e.g. 2500: 
qˆ = (399.076, 1754.624, 2653.000, 2723.204, 2979.563, 10098.383, 15273.639, 
18741.328, 22649.818, 13264.510, 7801.879, 4754.924, 1517.061, 2514.000, 
2560.000, 5613.061). 
Here, all the signal samples are non-negative. Therefore, the only requirement not 
fulfilled yet is the equality of corresponding mean values. To provide that, we need to 
multip ly qˆ  by the coefficient 
16 16
1 1
ˆ/ 0.054i i
i i
q q
= =
=∑ ∑ . 
The resultant signal has the same mean value and wavelet decomposition details as 
the initial one. This can be checked-up through easy but rather cumbersome 
calculations. 
Since quantities can be only integers, we need to round the signal. Finally, we get 
the required quantity signal q  (see Table 2, the fourth row). 
As we can see, the masked data are completely different from the primary ones, 
though both mean value and wavelet decomposition details are preserved. 
To finish the task, we need to compile a new microfile . It is always possible to do 
as long as there are enough records to modify vital values of. Anyway, we can always 
demand this when build ing-up linear programming problem constraints. 
 
Table 2. Quantity signals for the U.S. Census Bureau microfile. 
 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Area code  06010 06020 06030 06040 06060 06070 06080 06090 
Signal q  19 12 153 71 13 79 7 33 
Signal q  22 95 144 148 162 549 831 1019 
 
Column number 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Area code  06130 06170 06200 06220 06230 06409 06600 06700 
Signal q  16 270 812 135 241 14 60 4337 
Signal q  1232 722 424 259 83 137 139 305 
4   Conclusion and Future Research 
In the paper, we have set the task of providing group anonymity as a task of 
protecting such collective data patterns that cannot be retrieved by analyzing 
individual information only.  
We have proposed a wavelet-based method which aims at preserving the data 
wavelet details as a source of information on the data patterns and relations between 
their components with different frequencies, along with the data mean value. At the 
same time, the method actually provides group anonymity since an appropriate level 
of uncertainty is being introduced into the data (by modifying the wavelet 
approximation). 
The method is relatively easy and can be implemented programatically. Also, the 
method is rather flexible and can yield various resultant data sets depending on the 
particular task definit ion. Moreover, it can be combined with any existing individual 
anonymity methods to gain the most efficiently protected datasets. 
On the other hand, the method isn’t acceptable in various cases because it doesn't 
guarantee that some statistical data features, such as standard deviation, persist.  
In the paper, we only pointed out the problem of group anonymity. There remain 
many questions to answers and challenges to response. Among them we would 
especially like to stress on such ones: 
- Using different wavelet bases can lead to obtaining different data sets. 
- Modifying quantity signals isn't very useful for different real-life examples. In 
situations like protecting the regional distribution of middle-aged people the 
relative data such as ratios seem to be more important to protect. 
- In general, it is not always easy to define parameter and vital sets to determine 
the records to redistribute. This procedure also needs to be studied thoroughly 
in the future. 
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